Thiago Serra on Twitter: "Vitercik explains that Vickrey's second price auction — in which participants are incentivized to bid truthfully — may not necessarily maximize the revenue of an auction. For a
GitHub - ZhuangDingyi/VCG-Auction-Mechanism: Implementation of Vickrey– Clarke–Groves auction (VCG auction)
![The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves “Pivotal Mechanism” as an Alternative to Voting for Organizational Control | Semantic Scholar The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves “Pivotal Mechanism” as an Alternative to Voting for Organizational Control | Semantic Scholar](https://d3i71xaburhd42.cloudfront.net/bd12f75719c5625ea6a9316ffd308c44b373ff28/25-Table2-1.png)